How can international influences lead to nondemocratic regimes

Abstract

Why do nondemocratic regimes provide constituency service? This study develops theory based on a national field audit of China’s “Mayor’s Mailbox,” an institution that allows citizens to contact local political officials. Analyzing government responses to over 1,200 realistic appeals from putative citizens, we find that local service institutions in China are comparably responsive to similar institutions in democracies. Two key predictors of institutional quality are economic modernization and the intensity of local social conflict. We explain these findings by proposing a demand-driven theory of nondemocratic constituency service; in order to sustain the informational benefits of citizen participation, the responsiveness of service institutions must increase with citizen demand. We then offer supplementary evidence for this theory by analyzing the content of real letters from citizens to local officials in China.

Authors: 

von Soest, Christian
Grauvogel, Julia

Series/Report no.: 

GIGA Working Papers No. 277

Publisher: 

German Institute of Global and Area Studies (GIGA), Hamburg

Abstract: 

The analysis using the new Regime Legitimation Expert Survey (RLES) demonstrates that non-democratic rulers in post-Soviet countries use specific combinations of legitimating claims to stay in power. Most notably, rulers claim to be the guardians of citizens' socioeconomic well-being. Second, despite recurrent infringements on political and civil rights, they maintain that their power is rule-based and embodies the will of the people, as they have been given popular electoral mandates. Third, they couple these elements with inputbased legitimation strategies that focus on nationalist ideologies, the personal capabilities and charismatic aura of the rulers, and the regime's foundational myth. Overall, the reliance on these input-based strategies is lower in the western post-Soviet Eurasian countries and very pronounced among the authoritarian rulers of Central Asia.

Subjects: 

authoritarian regimes
claims to legitimacy
adaptation
expert survey
Post-Soviet countries

International Relations and Nondemocratic RuleInternational influences can support and contribute to nondemocratic rule.The most obvious way can be through occupation. While the occupation ofJapan and Germany led to democratization, in Eastern Europe, Soviet controlafter World War II brought an end to democratic movements and eliminatedmuch of civil society. Some countries, like Czechoslovakia, saw theirvibrant prewar democracies quickly dismantled and replaced with communistrule. In more indirect situations, imperialism has contributed to nondemocraticrule in various ways. Borders badly drawn by imperial powers, aswe discussed in Chapter 2, have created many countries with ethnic and religiousdivisions that make consensus building difficult and authoritarianisman effective way to monopolize power over other groups. Imperial institutions,from infrastructure and education to state institutions, have similarly fosteredauthoritarianism by contributing to such things as uneven modernization andweak state autonomy and capacity. Finally, other states and internationalorganizations may also support or sustain authoritarian control. During theOrigins and Sources of Nondemocratic Rule149Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States backed authoritarianrulers against democratic forces in order to maintain or expand their influence.The United States played a significant role in overthrowing the democraticallyelected government in Iran in 1953, fearing that the prime ministerwas tilting toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union crushed revolts in Hungaryin 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. With the rise of China and the moveaway from democracy in Russia, these two countries have become importantsupporters of nondemocratic regimes in Africa and the Middle East throughinvestment and diplomatic support in the international community. Iran andVenezuela, too, have sought to use their oil wealth to support like-mindedregimes.Culture and Nondemocratic RuleLet us return to the idea of political culture, which argues that there are differencesin societal institutions—norms and values—that shape the landscape

Abstract

Abstract The level of violence seen during transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule varies substantially. Recently, Tunisia experienced an almost bloodless transition, while in Libya the attempt to oust the Gadhafi regime ended in a civil war. This paper looks at the dynamics of democratic transitions, and attempts to explain why some become extremely violent while others progress peacefully. Specifically, the paper looks at the potential role of international governmental organizations (IGOs) for constraining or altering the behavior of non-democratic regimes, thereby influencing regime transitions. It argues that, by alleviating commitment problems between the outgoing regime and the new elites, and by imposing sanctions that reduce an incumbent regime's ability to reap the benefits of office, IGOs increase the likelihood of seeing a peaceful transition to democracy. However, the paper also argues that non-democratic leaders should anticipate this, and therefore that regimes that are members of highly interventionist IGOs should be less likely to liberalize at all. The paper finds evidence in favor of the proposition that IGOs increase the likelihood of a peaceful regime transition, and that non-democratic regimes that are members of highly interventionist IGOs anticipate being constrained by these organizations, and therefore are more reluctant to liberalize in the first place.

Journal Information

Conflict Management and Peace Science is a peer-reviewed journal published five times a year. CMPS contains scientific papers on topics such as: international conflict; arms races; the effect of international trade on political interactions; foreign policy decision making; international mediation; and game theoretic approaches to conflict and cooperation.

Publisher Information

Sara Miller McCune founded SAGE Publishing in 1965 to support the dissemination of usable knowledge and educate a global community. SAGE is a leading international provider of innovative, high-quality content publishing more than 900 journals and over 800 new books each year, spanning a wide range of subject areas. A growing selection of library products includes archives, data, case studies and video. SAGE remains majority owned by our founder and after her lifetime will become owned by a charitable trust that secures the company’s continued independence. Principal offices are located in Los Angeles, London, New Delhi, Singapore, Washington DC and Melbourne. www.sagepublishing.com

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